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2014 has already heralded two significant developments related to monitoring, 
reporting, and fact-finding (MRF) mechanisms for collecting information on alleged 
international law violations. First, the Human Rights Council (HRC) published their 
“Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” in February. This report may provide a 
roadmap for the second important development, the HRC’s decision in March to 
investigate alleged international law violations during the final phase of the armed 
conflict in Sri Lanka. More broadly, both these efforts offer lessons for any group or 
body participating in MRF activities. 
At the outset, the inherent challenges in developing and executing effective MRF 
mechanisms bear emphasizing. At the macro level, MRF often begins on a path 
where success is an unlikely destination. There tends to be disconnects in the overall 
mandate establishing the MRF mechanisms: between the mandate and the guidance 
issued to those implementing the mechanisms, or between the scope of the mandate 
and available resources. At the micro level, by definition MRF mechanisms occur in 
places where horrific events have traumatized and scarred individuals and the goals 
of impartiality, independence, and neutrality consequently often turn out to be 
mainly aspirational in practice. 
The HRC report on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
The Commission of Inquiry encountered a number of difficulties in conducting its 
investigation of “the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in 
the DPRK with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular, for violations that 
may amount to crimes against humanity.” To a certain extent, the Commission’s 
charge could be viewed as preordaining the results of the investigation: the 
commission stems from a 2013 Human Rights Council Resolution which itself flowed 
from the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North 
Korea following a two year comprehensive review. That this process has been 
ongoing in different forms and fashions for some time, and has concluded that 
human rights violations have occurred – and are still occurring – in North Korea, may 
by some be seen as reflecting a lack of impartiality and neutrality. But that view 
misunderstands the import of those two terms in the MRF context. Neutrality 
“requires MRF missions to refrain from taking sides on issues related to the relevant 
political conflicts,” while impartiality “entails maintaining an objective methodology in 
the implementation of an MRF mechanism,” as noted by Rob Grace and Claude 
Bruderlein. 
North Korea announced it would “totally reject and disregard” the investigation and 
refused to answer requests for information and for entering North Korea. Before 
publishing its report, the Commission provided draft findings to North Korea and 
invited a response and corrections – requests that went unanswered. 
The 372-page report begins by outlining the origin of the commission’s mandate, 
how the mandate was interpreted, and their methods of work. There is also a section 
on “non-cooperation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” This section is 
critically important for at least two reasons: (1) it allows the MRF entity, here the 
HRC, to document attempts to contact and include the perspective of the object of 
the investigation and thus how the MRF entity is striving for impartiality, 
independence, and neutrality and (2) it provides the base for understanding (and 
defending) why the MRF entity utilized sub-optimal ways of gathering information - 
access to specific locations investigators would want to visit and people investigators 
would want to interview was not possible. 
Beyond the report itself, the UN created an impressive collection of online resources. 
There is a question and answers section, background information, satellite images of 
political prison camps, a map of North Korea, videos of (and transcripts from) the 
Commission’s public hearings held in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington DC, and 
even graphic illustrations by a former North Korean political prisoner. There is also 
media outreach section, which includes contact information for anyone seeking 
further information. Of particular note, the biographies of the three commissioners – 
Michael Kirby from Australia, Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia, and Senja Biserko 
from Serbia – are also available online. 
The next challenge is the “so what” question – meaning what outcomes does the 
report generate. The goal according to the International Bar Association’s Guidelines 
on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports is that 
[i]f a report has been compiled in accordance with these guidelines it indicates that the
allegations, observations and conclusions in it can be reasonably relied upon, thus enhancing
the efficacy and credibility of the report. This will enhance fact finding as a step in a
constructive process to improve the general climate of human rights compliance and to protect
the victims of human rights violations.
The North Korea report concluded with a number of recommendations, including 
that: 
The Security Council should refer the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to 
the International Criminal Court for action in accordance with that court’s jurisdiction. The 
Security Council should also adopt targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most 
responsible for crimes against humanity. In the light of the dire social and economic situation 
of the general population, the Commission does not support sanctions imposed by the Security 
Council or introduced bilaterally that are targeted against the population or the economy as a 
whole. 
In the view of at least one of the report’s commissioners, Judge Kirby, "[m]ore 
monitoring and engagement alone cannot suffice in the face of crimes that shock the 
conscience of humanity. […] Perpetrators must be held accountable, it is necessary 
to deter further crimes." 
The HRC resolution on Sri Lanka 
On 27 March 2014, the HRC adopted a resolution, which 
requested the Office of the High Commissioner to undertake a comprehensive investigation 
into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties 
in Sri Lanka during the period covered by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, 
and to establish the facts and circumstances of such alleged violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring accountability, with assistance from 
relevant experts and special procedures mandate holders. 
According to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, Sri Lanka has 
“consistently failed to establish the truth and achieve justice” by not adequately 
“investigating possible war crimes during the military operations that crushed the 
Tamil Tigers’ brutal rebellion to establish a homeland five years ago.” 
Sri Lanka is now, in a sense, where North Korea was in 2013. But the language in 
the mandate for the Sri Lankan inquiry is more open than that for North Korea. And 
Sri Lanka has participated to a degree in the process thus far. Referring to an earlier 
report, similar to the response of North Korea, “[t]he Government of Sri Lanka 
reiterates its categorical rejection of the Conclusions and Recommendations 
contained in the High Commissioner’s Report, reflecting bias and is tantamount to an 
unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State.” But unlike 
North Korea, Sri Lanka’s rejection is not the sum total of its comments. Rather, Sri 
Lanka reiterated its rejection in the last paragraph of 18 pages of comments. And Sri 
Lanka has allowed the High Commissioner “to go anywhere and see anything” she 
“wished to see” in Sri Lanka. 
On the other hand, following the HRC's resolution calling for an inquiry, 
the Sri Lanka government moved to break the links between Tamils in the country and the 
diaspora by introducing regulations that named 16 organizations and 424 individuals in the 
diaspora as financiers of terrorism. […] While the regulations state the listed organizations are 
being penalized for terrorism financing, their broader effect is to prevent Tamils in Sri Lanka 
from using the diaspora as a conduit to alert the world about human rights violations. These 
measures aim to isolate Tamils living within the country from those abroad. 
And it is the Tamil diaspora that “is expected to play a prominent role in presenting 
evidence at the [UN] inquiry.” 
The question of to what extent Sri Lanka cooperates with and participates in the 
inquiry may depend in part on how events unfold regarding North Korea. North 
Korea did not cooperate with the HRC inquiry. That inquiry concluded that 
“[s]ystematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been, and are 
being, committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions and 
officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the Commission 
constitute crimes against humanity.” 
If North Korea suffers adverse affects from the HRC report, that may signal to Sri 
Lanka, and others, that participation and cooperation are advisable, or at least a 
better course of action than the alternative. But if there are no ramifications, the 
international community will be unintentionally sending a very different message – 
that States need not cooperate with UN inquiries. This latter outcome would be a 
large setback for MRF mechanisms, the relevance of the HRC, and international law 
writ large. 
We shall see. 
About the author 
Chris Jenks is an assistant professor of law and directs the criminal justice clinic at 
the SMU Dedman School of Law in Dallas, Texas. He has published articles on 
drones, child soldiers, extraordinary rendition, law of war based detention, targeting 
and government contractors. He has also spoken on those same topics at universities 
and institutes in Australia, Brazil, Italy, South Africa and the United States, and with 
the militaries of the Republic of Yemen and several different European and African 
countries. Chris has served for over 20 years in the U.S. military, including as the 
primary international and operational law advisor near the demilitarized zone 
between North and South Korea. 
